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Digest: People v. Pitto
Benjamin Price

Opinion by Baxter, J., with George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J.,
Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J. Dissenting Opinion by Kennard, J.
Issue
Is a sentence enhancement pursuant to California Penal Code section
12022 proper for those who are armed with a firearm in the commission of
specified offenses, although the defendant's purpose for having the weapon
was unrelated to the offense?
Facts
On May 23, 2003, police officers detained defendant Michael Pitto in
an area commonly used for methamphetamine sales. 1 The officers,
searching defendant's van, found a bag containing a small quantity of
methamphetamine under a floorboard and an unloaded handgun stored in a
cardboard box behind the driver's seat. 2 The prosecution's witnesses
testified that the gun was likely for purposes of protecting the drugs
possessed for sale, because the gun was "within arm's reach of defendant"
and could be quickly loaded. 3 Defendant admitted that he intentionally
placed the drugs and the gun there, but argued that the drugs were for his
own personal consumption and that he bought the gun because he planned
to commit suicide. 4
Defendant was convicted of possessing for sale and transporting
methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code sections
11377(a) and 11379(a). 5 The jury sustained the charges under Penal Code
section 12022 that he was "armed" with a firearm in the commission of the
related offenses and therefore subject to a sentence enhancement. 6 He was
sentenced to eighteen years in prison. 7
The court of appeal found that the trial court's jury instruction
concerning the meaning of "armed" in Section 12022 failed to adequately
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People v. Pitto, 180 P.3d 338, 340 (Cal. 2008).
!d.
!d. at 338, 340.
!d. at 341.
/d. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE§§ 11377(a), 11379(a)).
!d. (citing CAL. PEN. CODE§ 12022(a)( I), (c)).
/d. at 342.
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explain the link between the firearm and the drug crime. 8 The court,
finding that this instructional error was a constitutional violation not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reversed the conviction to the extent
that defendant was found to be armed in the commission of the crimesY
The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the judgment
of the Court of Appeal. 10
Analysis
The Court observed that, under People v. Bland, Section 12022 does
not require that the defendant use or even carry a firearm for the sentence
enhancement to apply. 11 A defendant is "armed" under Section 12022 as
long as the gun is "available for use, either offensively or defensively." 12
Bland expressed that, because "the mere presence and potential for use of a
firearm at a crime scene increases the risk of injury and death," Section
12022 is meant to "deter and punish persons who create such dangerous
situations in the course of committing crimes." 13
The Court articulated the principle in Bland that, '"[ w]hen the
prosecution has proved a charge of felony drug possession, and the
evidence at trial shows that a firearm was found in close proximity to the
illegal drugs in a place frequented by the defendant, a jury may reasonably
infer (1) that the defendant knew of the firearm's presence, (2) that its
presence together with the drugs was not accidental or coincidental, and (3)
that, at some point during the period of illegal drug possession, the
defendant was present with both the drugs and the firearm and thus that the
firearm was available for the defendant to put to immediate use to aid in the
drug possession. "' 14
Applying these principles, the Court said that this was a "classic case
for finding that the defendant was armed while possessing and transporting
a controlled substance." 15 The Court looked to the proximity of the gun to
the drugs, defendant's intent of placing them there, and the ease with which
the gun could be reached and loaded. 16 Thus, the Court said, "a rational
jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun was
available 'to protect the defendant during a drug sale, to guard against theft
of the drugs, or to ward off police. "' 17
Defendant argued that the trial court should have given a special
instruction allowing the jury to find that there was no "facilitative nexus"
s !d.
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at 342-43.
at 343, 345.
at 343 (citing People v. Bland. 898 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1995)).
(quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391 ).
at 238 (quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391) (internal citations omitted).
at 344.
(internal citations omitted).
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between the gun and the drugs because he possessed the gun for a reason
unrelated to the drug crimes. 18 He argued that, under Bland, a different
purpose would show that the proximity of the gun was accidental or
coincidental. 19 The Court rejected this argument because Bland does not
impose an intent requirement. 20 Regardless of his motive, the Court said,
"the opportunity and incentive to later resort to using the gun in
perpetrating the crime is the same."21
Holding
The Court held that defendant was not entitled to a special jury
instruction on whether he intended to use the gun for a purpose unrelated to
drug possession in determining whether he was "armed" with a firearm in
the commission of the specified drug offenses within the meaning of
Section 12022. 22
Dissent
Justice Kennard agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the
trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on Bland's nexus
requirement. 23 He reasoned that Bland interpreted the phrase, "armed ...
in the commission" of a felony as requiring a "facilitative nexus" or link
between the firearm and the drug offense. 24 He also said that, under Bland,
a jury's inference that the firearm's proximity to the drugs was not
"accidental or coincidental" may be "refuted by defense evidence" to the
contrary, which he said occurred in this case. 25 He argued that the trial
court's instruction to the jury precluded it from considering the defense's
theory that the gun's presence was unrelated to the drugs. 26
Legal Significance
This case effectively eradicates the facilitative nexus defense to a
sentence enhancement under Section 12022 when a defendant knows of the
nearby presence of a firearm while perpetrating a drug offense. The
sentence enhancement may be applied regardless of whether the firearm's
presence near the drugs was for the intended purpose of facilitating the
offense. Rather, the defendant may be found to be armed in the
commission of the drug offense as long as he knows of its presence, that its
presence was not accidental or coincidental, and that the firearm was
available for use.
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!d.
!d. at 346.
ld. at 348 (quoting CAL. PEN. CODE§ 12022(a)(l); People v. Bland, 898 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1995)).
Jd. at 349 (quoting Bland, 898 P.2d 391).
Id. at 350.
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